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IV.—THE SEQUENCE OF TENSES IN LATIN.

SECOND PAPER.

II.

In our former paper, the examination of the received doctrine of the Sequence of Tenses betrayed the fact that the great mass of constructions are exempt from the supposed Law; and accordingly forced us to set up, for examination, the opposite hypothesis, namely, that there exists no such law,—that, in a word, the tense of the dependent subjunctive conveys temporal meaning, precisely as does the tense of an independent subjunctive or indicative.

To the support of this hypothesis every proof which we have seen militating against the other doctrine will at once repair, and will form a powerful force. The sole question then remains, Can phenomena be produced which the hypothesis cannot fairly explain? If so, then there exists, as yet, no tenable hypothesis, and we Latinists must go to work to study the facts and reach a sound doctrine on this important and very practical subject; if there exist no such phenomena, then we may at once label our hypothesis *doctrine*, formulate it in a shape suitable for tender minds, and teach it.

Now, a search over the whole field will be able to produce six objections with which to challenge the hypothesis, namely:

1. The fact that in the great majority of cases the tenses are such as would be in conformity to the supposed Law of the Sequence;
2. The fact that exceptions do not occur in the *antequam* and *dum* group of constructions;
3. The common use of the imperfect in so-called clauses of result after secondary tenses;
4. The use of a secondary tense of the subjunctive, in connection with a main verb in the past, to express ideas corresponding to facts known to be true at the time of speaking, or even universally true;
5. The use of a secondary subjunctive, in connection with conditions and conclusions contrary to fact, to express ideas corresponding to facts known to be true at the time of speaking, or even universally true;
6. The common use of the forms *-turus fuerit*, etc., after primary tenses to represent conclusions contrary to fact.

1. The first objection need detain us but a moment. As has been already suggested in connection with the use of the present in consecutive clauses, the phenomena are what they are because the ideas which they express are such as come oftenest, owing to the constitution of things in this world, into the human brain. To take up, for example, the "exceptions," there are not many present results of remote causes; while, on the other hand, the only result in the past that can follow a present cause is an historical example of a cause universally existing, or, at least, always existing up to the present time. A characterizing present is rarely found in connection with a remote main act, because the facts or tendencies which characterize a person concerned in a past activity are mostly facts or tendencies that were neighbors of the main activity.¹ When, however, a present fact or tendency can be found that characterizes a person concerned in a past activity, as in the case cited from Pliny the Younger, the Latin, like other languages, simply says in the dependent verb what there is to say. Similarly, the reasons which governed past acts or judgments mostly lie in, and are thought in connection with, the past, and can lie in, or be thought in connection with, the present, only if they are general or habitual facts on which a past act or judgment was based, or past facts on which a present judgment is based; and, in the same way, a present act or judgment is commonly brought about by a reason near at hand, though that reason may occasionally be an act habitual in the past, etc. The same things are true of acts that stand to each other in an adversative relation. As regards final sentences, the purpose of a remote act must itself have lain in the past, and the purpose of a present act cannot, in strictness, lie in the past; though a past purpose may be associated, as in Livy's *ut ferrent, porto*, with an activity begun in the past and still going on (cf. John I 31: but that he *should be made* manifest unto Israel, therefore *am I come* baptizing with water), and a past activity may be associated with a purpose expressed as now existing. And, in general, the theory that the Romans used the tenses they did in the subordinate clauses because in each case the particular tense used expressed precisely what they wanted to say, is entirely consistent, as I believe, with the facts, encountering not a single exception in the whole range of Latin literature; while the theory of an outside determination of

¹ I am obliged at this point, in default of the explanation of the meanings of the tenses in Part IV, to content myself with a defective phraseology.

the tense of the dependent clause is confronted at every turn by obstacles that cannot be disposed of, to the satisfaction of a thinking mind, by the magic of any such phrase as "exception to the rule."

2. The second objection likewise need detain us but a moment, for the facts on which it rests have already been explained in the answer to objection 1.

For brevity's sake we will speak of the set of constructions (after *antequam*, *priusquam*, *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*) as the *antequam* set.

The indicative construction gives us two facts, main and subordinate, arranged in the order of their occurrence, and with a clear mark of that order in the shape of the adverb + relative, *antequam*. The subjunctive construction gives us no fact. The act pictured in it may have taken place later, or may never have taken place at all. All that makes no difference whatever. The act itself is simply represented as existing *in somebody's brain* at a certain time which the narrator has in mind. That time, of course, is the time of the main act. In Liv. 1, 26, 1: *priusquam inde digrederentur, roganti Mettius ex foedere icto quid imperaret, imperat Tullus*, we are not told in the least that Mettius and Tullus went away, but only that they *had a going-away in mind*, and that, *with that departure in view*, the one asked, and the other gave, instructions. *Digrederentur*, then, is not an historical incident noted by the narrator, an event (indicative) serving as a *terminus ante quem* for the main act, but the *thought* of Mettius and Tullus; and, in general, these subjunctive constructions present an act as *the thought of some important person in the main sentence*, generally the principal actor. Now, if the actor acted in the past, then the thought in the light of which he acted must have been in the past; while if the actor is acting as I speak, his thought must lie in the present, etc. So, then, the very simple reason why the verb of the main clause (act asserted) and the verb of the subordinate clause (act thought) are always of the same order of tenses (both in the past, or both in the present, or both in the future) is that, in the constitution of things, nobody's mind can conceive any other kind of combination; and what we cannot conceive, we naturally have no occasion to express. Precisely as under 1, then, the explanation of the grammatical phenomena is found to be, not a mechanical dependence, but the constitution of this world. And it would be as unreasonable to explain the observed facts by a supposed influence of tense upon tense, as it would be to explain in the same way the fact that we do not find in Latin literature any imperfect

subjunctive of result after a future cause, instead of recognizing that there never has been, nor ever can be, a past result of an act that has not yet taken place.

3. The common use of the imperfect in clauses of result attached to causes lying in the past.

In occasional instances, it might be claimed that the imperfect subjunctive has, so far as tense goes, the same force as the imperfect indicative, portraying *e. g.* a resulting state of affairs, just as the imperfect indicative does in Greek after *ὥστε*. But in the great majority of cases in the narrative style there can be no doubt that the independent form of expression of the result would be the aorist indicative, just as in abundant cases in Greek. If, then, the tense tells its own story, why not the aorist subjunctive?

It is a pretty question, and all the more so because it is necessarily interlinked with another pretty question, namely: in clauses of strict result, which are necessarily clauses of fact, *why the subjunctive at all?* Why not the indicative, as in Sanscrit, Greek, German, English, etc., etc.? What is the history of this purely Roman form of expression?¹

The solution is not difficult. The so-called result-clause is in its origin no clause of resulting fact. It makes no unlimited assertion—no assertion that a certain thing has taken place, is taking place, or will take place. The assertion which it makes is a *limited* one, an assertion that keeps within the limits of the visions of the mind. In Latin such an assertion is expressed by the subjunctive, in Greek by the optative. In Latin the limited nature of the assertion is marked by the mood only.; in Greek it is marked not only by the mood, but also by the use of the admirable little label *ἄν*. Where the Latin says *scias—you'd know*—the Greek says *γνῶις ἄν*. Still, even without the *ἄν*, the Roman is able to make a clear difference between assertions like *you'd understand easily, facile intellegas*, and assertions like *you understand easily, facile intellegis*; between assertions like *you saw, videbas*, and assertions like *you'd see, videres*.

Now, the source of all the consecutive sentences, whether after *quī* or after *ut*—a perfectly definite and concrete source—is this expression of independent limited assertion.² In the coördinating

¹ From Anglo-Saxon the manuals cite a few examples of the subjunctive in a resulting fact-clause, of which I find no discussion.

² I dissent materially from Dahl (*Die lat. Partikel VT*, pp. 153-164), finding his treatment too metaphysical, and not resolutely historical.

form you may say, *e. g.*, of a given theory *you'd easily understand it: it is a very simple thing*. The first clause is just as independent a statement as the second; it has a construction entirely of its own. So much is evident at the outset. Looking further at its contents, we see that the statement, in point of fact, throws a certain light upon the nature of the thing in question; it is practically only another way of saying *a very simple thing*; it is, in other words, an *independent characterizing statement*. Reverse the order, putting the subjunctive statement last—*it is a very simple thing: you'd easily understand it*—and it of course remains precisely what it was before, an *independent, an unattached, characterizing statement*.

Wait now for the use of the relative to develop, and then, since the same object of thought occurs in both sentences, tie them together by using *which* instead of *it* in the second, and you have, without any change in the grounds of the mood, the *dependent, the attached, characterizing statement*, common to all languages.

I could a tale unfold whose lightest word would harrow up thy soul.—Shak. Hamlet, 1, 5.

Who is here so base that would be a bondman?—Shak. Jul. Caes. 3, 2.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν τὰς πατρικὰς βασιλείας παραλαβόντων τίς οὐκ ἂν τοὺς Εὐαγόρου κινδύνους προκρίνειεν; (independent characterizing question, corresponding to a characterizing predication). Οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστιν οὕτω ῥάθυμος ὅστις ἂν δέξαιτο παρὰ τῶν προγόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην παραλαβεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ κτησάμενος ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν; (dependent characterizing predication). Isocr. Evag. 35: . . . *who would not rather choose . . . ? There is no one so easy-going that (he) would prefer, etc.*

Τίς οὖν οὕτως ἀγαθὸς ἢ τίς οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὥς λιμῶ καὶ ῥίγει δύναιτ' ἂν μαχόμενος στρατεύεσθαι; Xen. Cyr. 6, 1, 14. *Who is so brave or who so strong that (he) could serve a campaign against hunger and cold?*

Nihil est aequè quod faciam lubens. Ter. Phorm. 565. *There is nothing that I should so like to do.*

Vin primum hodie facere quod ego gaudeam, Nausistrata, et quod tuo viro oculi doleant? Ter. Phorm. 1052-3. *Do you want to begin to-day, Nausistrata, by doing something that would delight me, and would make your husband's eyes smart?*

Cupio videre qui id audeat dicere. Cic. Phil. 5, 2, 6. *I want to see the man that would venture to say that.*

By a precisely similar development the relative locative *uti* (*ut*), which differs from *qui* only in having a sentence for an antecedent instead of a single word,¹ introduces a characterizing statement (called a result-clause) of limited predication, precisely as do the corresponding Greek sentence-relative *ὥς* (an ablative) and *ὥστε*, and the English *that*. A perfect specimen would be had by transposing the two sentences, with *ut* for a connective, in the following, from Tac. Ann. I, 81, 1: *de comitiis consularibus, quae tum primum illo principe ac deinceps fuere, vix quicquam firmare ausim: adeo diversa non modo apud auctores sed in ipsius orationibus reperiantur.*

Βρέφος γάρ ἦν τότε ἐν Κλυταιμνήστρας χερσίν, ὅτ' ἐξέλειπον μέλαθρον ἐς Τροίαν ἰὼν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίσαιμ' ἂν εἰσιδών. Eurip. Orest. 377-9. *He was a babe in Clytemnestra's arms when, setting off for Troy, I left my roof, (whereby) so that I should not know him setting eyes on him.*

Quae (occupatio) etsi summa est, tamen nulla esse potest tanta ut interrumpat iter amoris nostri. Cic. Att. 4, 2, 1. *Though my occupations are very pressing, still none could be so pressing as to (that they would) interrupt the course of our love.*

The Latin, however, alone among languages, extends this wholly logical characterizing construction beyond its original bounds. After *τίς οὕτως ἐνέθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν*, *e. g.*, the Greek distinguishes perfectly between *ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ* and *ὅστις ἂν ἀγνοεῖ*, just as the English distinguishes perfectly between *that knows not* and *that would not know*. The Latin, however, fails to make such a distinction as might have been expressed, after *quis est vestrum tam stultus*, by *qui nesciat* and *qui nescit*. The form of which *qui nesciat* is a type comes to be practically a phrase of *tendency*, of *natural direction toward some act*, and so conveys very much the same feeling as does the English *such as to*, in which *as* is a relative, while the suggestion of *direction* is conveyed by the preposition *to*. This may be called the second stage in the history of the construction. Next there intrudes into the idea conveyed by the construction, which does not in itself deal with the world of reality, an idea that squints at that world. If I say *he is such a man as never to lie*, I might as well have said *he is a man who never lies*, and might, indeed, very easily be quoted as having said that precise thing. In many Latin sentences, in fact, it is impossible to be sure whether limited

¹ *Uti* might be rudely rendered *whereby*; for the word *by* likewise begins with expressing a local relation, and then passes into an expression of means.

or unlimited predication is meant. And so the thing felt and the thing said come to be confused, and the construction of the latter is used to express the idea of the former; or, in other words, in the Latin language the mood of characterizing predication limited becomes also, in relative sentences, the mood of characterizing predication unlimited.

So much for the mood. As regards the tense, the present expresses a limited predication of an act thought as future to the time of speaking; while the tense for limited predication of an act thought as similarly situated relatively to a past time is the so-called imperfect. An example will give a clear idea of this latter use. *In this way I should get at the real thing* would be, in Tacitean phraseology, *hoc modo id incorruptum sit*. The same idea put interrogatively would be *quonam modo id incorruptum sit*. Let time pass on, and then state a past question of this sort, and you have *quonam modo id incorruptum foret*, as Tacitus uses it in Ann. 2, 12, 3, in dependence upon *agitabat* (*igitur propinquo summae rei discrimine explorandos militum animos ratus, quonam id modo incorruptum foret secum agitabat*).

Inasmuch as to carry a limited statement back into the past is practically to quote it, which requires the use of the infinitive, it is not strange that we but rarely find examples of this imperfect subjunctive in the independent declarative form. A remarkable instance, however, is to be found in the oratio obliqua in Caes. B. C. 3, 73: *contionem apud milites habuit . . . dandam omnibus operam ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur; quod si esset factum* (future condition), *detrimētum in bonum verteret* (future conclusion).¹

Now, the constructions *nihil est aequē quod faciam lubens* (*there is nothing that I should so gladly do*) become, when stated again for the original situation after some time has elapsed, *nihil erat aequē quod facerem lubens* (to translate into unfamiliar but intelligible English, *there was at that time nothing that I would at that time so gladly do*). *Faciam* and *facerem* both express limited predication, each from its standpoint, and the sole differ-

¹ Other examples are probably *proficeret* and *citaret* in Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 6 and 7. It is a very illustrative fact, furthermore, that in English the corresponding forms of limited predication from a past standpoint (namely, the auxiliaries *would*, *should*, etc.) are the regular forms of expression in indirect quotations, as, e. g., in the translation of *verteret* above. The construction, of course, plays a large part in both languages, in a secondary stage, as the means of expression for conclusions contrary to fact.

ence lies in that standpoint. The *faciat* of to-day becomes the *faceret* of to-morrow's retrospect. So far, all is strictly logical. And when the construction of the mood extends itself in Latin, the tense and the mood go together, the former still carrying the idea of *connection with a past time*; and the tense is no more the product of a subtile influence exerted by the tense of the main verb than is the mood the product of a subtile influence exerted by the mood of the main verb.¹

4. The use of a secondary tense of the subjunctive, in connection with a main verb in the past, to express ideas corresponding to facts known to be true at the time of speaking, or even universally true.

A universal fact may be regarded with reference to its bearing upon some present act or judgment, or with reference to its bearing upon some past act or judgment. In the first case it is a universal truth put as *now applicable*, in the second a universal truth put as *then applicable*. That which tells whether the point of view from which the universal truth is applied is that of a present judgment or that of a past judgment, is the tense. Its power is seen clearly in independent sentences in English; *e. g.* the sentence *Tyranny is never right—the orator says—even if it be the tyranny of a majority over a minority*, becomes, as we speak of the same utterance later, *Tyranny was never right—the orator said—even if it were the tyranny of a majority over a minority*.² It is not even necessary, in such a use, to have any word indicating an indirectness of statement; *e. g.* in Guizot's *Earth and Man* (preface, p. vi) I find this sentence: *Numerous quotations and references were incompatible with the form of these discourses*. They remain incompatible; but the point is not the general incompatibility as recognized at the time of writing the preface, but the incompatibility as recognized and acted upon at the time of the writing of the discourses. The matter may then be briefly stated as follows: general or lasting facts may be put, in their larger aspect, in the general present or so-called logical perfect, or, in their aspect as bearing

¹ The mood in the resulting fact-clause never freed itself from its illegitimate origin, never became the indicative; but the tense in these clauses did after a while—first in Cicero's time—partly free itself from its illegitimate origin, and frequently appears, in appropriate places, as the aorist. In the main, however, the old habit continues, and the aorist therefore always had the power of catching sharply the attention.

² On this point, and others connected with it, Otto Behaghel's *Die Zeitfolge der abhängigen Rede im Deutschen* is very helpful.

upon some past act at the time of which they likewise existed, in the imperfect or logical pluperfect.

The same phenomena occur in Latin in the indicative in subordinate clauses, as in Cic. Fam. 5, 2, 9: *sed tamen fieri non moleste tuli atque etiam, ut ita fieret, pro mea parte adiuvi, ut senati consulto meus inimicus, quia tuus frater erat, sublevaretur* (the lasting fact, *tuus frater est*, furnishes a ground for action on the past occasion mentioned; for which time, of course, the statement must be, not *est*, but *erat*). A comparison of *pertinerent* and the precisely parallel *pertinebant* in the two sentences following will show what the feeling of the tense of the subjunctive is: Cic. Tusc. 1, 1, 1: . . . *et, cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis litteris inlustrandum putavi . . .*; De Or. 3, 19, 72: *Namque, ut ante dixi, veteres illi usque ad Socratem omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores hominum, quae ad vitam, quae ad virtutem, quae ad rem publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi ratione iungebant.*

One cannot, therefore, believe in a mechanical and unfeeling use of the subjunctive in these cases, unless he is prepared also to believe in a mechanical and unfeeling use of the indicative in similar sentences, including independent sentences in modern languages.

5. The use of a secondary tense of the subjunctive, in dependence upon conditions and conclusions contrary to fact, to express ideas corresponding to facts known to be true at the time of speaking, or even universally true.

In complex sentences made up of a main sentence with subjunctive verb and one or more subordinate sentences, the modal feeling in the speaker's mind which expresses itself in the main sentence is, in the nature of things, very likely to continue in the speaker's mind in the subordinated sentence or sentences, either quite unchanged or but slightly shaded. If, for example, I say in Latin, *Let him send whom he will, mittat quem velit*, the mood in *velit* is not a case of "attraction" or "assimilation" at all. *Velit* is as much a jussive as *mittat* is. The meaning is, *Let him choose his man, and send that man*, or, in older English, *choose he his man and send him*. In *sei ques esent quei sibi deicerent necesus ese Bacanal habere* (C. I. 196), the *deicerent* is as much a future condition (= *sei ques deicerent*) as *esent* is. In the sentence in Mr. Howells's Lemuel Barker (cap. 23), *If a person heard afterwards, when I*

had made out *something*, if I ever did, that I had been a servant, would *they* despise me for it?, the *had made out* is as much an ideal state of affairs in the future as is the main condition, *heard*; and the Latin-speaking man would, of course, use in both of them the same mood, with an unchanged feeling. But he would also, of course, use a tense of the same set—not because he had used a primary tense in the main sentence, but because the feeling which he has to express when he gets to the second verbal idea requires the same kind of a tense to convey it. Tense and mood are here inseparable. Precisely like the case from Mr. Howells is Lucretius's *nec, si materiam nostram collegerit aetas . . . pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum*, interrupta semel cum sit *repententia nostri* (3, 847–851), though Munro, with a less delicate feeling than a Roman's, translates by *has* instead of *had*. Similarly in Cicero's *quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio* (Off. 2, 14, 51), *cum scriberem* does not mean *especially now that I am writing*, but *especially if I were writing* (I should not venture to write this, especially if writing, as now, about philosophy, were it not that Panaetius takes the same view), as Madvig recognizes (Gramm., §383, 2), though the translation fails to convey what he points out.

Now, this same delicacy of feeling appears to me palpably to obtain in a great many cases where we find, attached to a condition or conclusion contrary to fact, a subordinate clause the contents of which are known to correspond to objective reality. I do not feel that in these cases the Roman verb predicates objective reality at all, but rather that the thought is colored by the ideal complexion of the whole feeling. In Cic. N. D. 1, 17, 45: *si nihil aliud quaeremus nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima . . . et . . .*, the aim in *coleremus*, whatever may be the objective facts in regard to our habits of worship, is in this case an inseparable part of the unreal condition *si nihil aliud quaereremus*; and, in precisely the same way, the *cum aeterna esset* is not a general ground asserted as having a present bearing, but a general ground recognized as one that *would bear* upon this ideal case (= *in that case the surpassing nature of the gods would receive the pious worship of mankind, being—still in that case—recognized as eternal, etc.*).

The same thing is true, though with a still finer shade of meaning,

in Cic. Inv. 1, 2, 3: . . . *qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea quae ratione invenissent, eloquentia persuadere potuissent* . . . ; *how could all this have taken place, had not men—supposing them to have made discoveries—also had the gift of commending them by fair words?* *Quae invenissent* is not an independent assertion, though such an assertion might, of course, be made, but an assumption forming a part of an ideal sum total.

So far under this head, I trust my readers are still with me, and are disposed, after these examples, to look for a modal feeling, rather than an entire absence of both modal and temporal feeling, in constructions of this sort in general; recognizing, too, that our own language is less fine in expression—which means that our feeling itself is less fine—than that of the Roman, as is exemplified by Munro's "*has*" in the rendering of the passage cited from Lucretius. This being so, we will now examine a case of the same kind, presenting as great a difficulty as can be summoned up, the passage Cic. Tusc. 1, 5, 9: *nam si solos eos diceres miseros quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum qui viverent exciperes*. A rough rendering would be: *For if you applied the name wretched to such alone as were doomed to die, you could not make an exception for such as breathed the breath of life, no, not for one*. Even in the English translation, I cannot feel that the verbs *were doomed* and *breathed* are merely perverted assertions—verbs not only tenseless but modeless—but rather that, though corresponding to facts which every one knows, they are here set up in the imagination as an integral and indivisible part of the sum total of the ideal condition and conclusion; so that it would be a fair rendering of the feeling, though a bulky one, to translate as follows: Supposing there were *people doomed to die—and we know that all men are—and supposing you called those people, and no others, unhappy*, then, assuming the existence of living people *in this world—a safe assumption—you would have to call every soul of them by the same word, unhappy*.

The cases that fall under this head, then, are not specimens of a mechanical adaptation of outward form, but of a very subtle and delicate modal feeling, existing consistently alike in the main idea and in subordinate ideas that form an integral part of it.¹

¹ Upon this point really turns the whole battle. But that battle is no longer for the saving of the Sequence of Tenses *in toto*; it is for the saving only of a little territory covered by a part of the examples under this one head. If there are any who believe that this modal feeling does not exist, and that the use of

6. The sole remaining hope of the doctrine lies in the use of the periphrastic form *-turus fuerit*, etc., in certain of those cases in which a conclusion contrary to fact is put as dependent—in certain of them only, be it observed; for we have to begin at once to make inroads even upon this petty territory. Firstly, the matter touches only conclusions contrary to fact in past time; conclusions contrary to fact in present time remain their simple selves and ignore the so-called sequence (A. J. P. VII, p. 463). Secondly, the rule is almost constantly violated after secondary tenses (where under its sway the tense ought to remain unaffected) by the change of a pluperfect to the historical perfect *fuerit* with the future participle, etc. The corresponding indicative form, the *modus operandi* of which we need not recall, is in use in the independent construction, but, be it observed, is there the less common construction, while in the dependent form it is used in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. Now, this use¹ marks a distinct preference of the Romans, and a preference all the more striking because it goes against the sup-

the tense in some of these cases is purely mechanical, then they should feel that we have come at last to a class of phenomena to which the doctrine of the temporal expressiveness of all subjunctives does not apply. But it by no means follows that they are thereby justified in holding the doctrine of the half-tenselessness (I say half-tenselessness because it is universally granted that the dependent subjunctive tense retains one of the two powers of the independent tense, that of distinguishing between actions complete and actions without reference to completeness) of all dependent subjunctives. They should in that case hold that, as there is undoubtedly a point in the stylistic development of the language at which the subjunctive mood is used without modal meaning (the final stylistic outcome of the common natural unity of modal feeling in a succession of verbs attached to a subjunctive)—though not commonly so used—in the same way, there is a point at which the tense also carries no meaning—though not commonly so used. And, at the very least, it is clear, after the exhibit in the previous paper of the great range of the “exceptions,” that one who believes in the Law of Sequence should believe in it as a law which nobody is bound to obey—a law which, whatever it may do, never trammels a speaker or writer; for, even in the set of cases just now under discussion, a writer is perfectly free to break with the supposed Law, as Cicero does in the sentence already cited from Fam. 13, 6a, 4: *quae quantum in provincia valeant, vellem expertus essem, sed tamen suspicor*. Even to add to the statement of the Law in the grammars so much of a concession as this would save teachers in the preparatory schools from difficulties (see page 71, below) which I have been told they now experience.

¹ It is not quite universal; see Livy, 2, 33, 10: *Tantumque sua laude obstitit famae consulis Marcius, ut, nisi foedus cum Latinis columna aenea insculptum monumento esset, ab Sp. Cassio uno, quia collega afuerat, ictum, Postumum Cominium bellum gessisse cum Volscis memoria cessisset*.

posed rule.¹ The feeling that probably underlies it we will not take time to discuss.

We have now narrowed the ground to absolutely the last phenomenon that can be claimed for a Sequence of Tenses, namely, the use in conclusions contrary to fact after primary tenses only (*the supposed rule being nearly always violated after secondary*), and in forms referring to the past only (*the supposed rule being always violated in forms referring to the present*) of the periphrastic *-turus fuerit*, etc., instead of the pluperfect subjunctive. The amount of evidence for the Sequence of Tenses which this use affords, seen in the light of the contradiction of that evidence on its own territory in the habitual violation of the Sequence after secondary tenses, and the universal violation of it when the conclusion refers to present time,² and seen, further, in the light of the enormous evidence presented on the other side by phenomenon after phenomenon in construction after construction, is so very small, that even if its use were without an exception, one would not be too bold who should consider the probability to be overwhelming that the ground of the use lay in a special liking for the subordinated form of the future participle with *fuerit* (a preference habitual, as we have seen, in despite of the supposed law, after secondary tenses, and possibly reinforced by the constant use of a similar infinitive form in main statements in indirect discourse), and not in any supposed law. But, in point of fact, we find that even in this last little shred of territory which our examination has not yet stripped from the kingdom of the Sequence of Tenses, Cicero finds the pluperfect subjunctive entirely competent to express the temporal idea he wants to convey, as in *pro Sest.* 29, 62: *quod ille si repudiasset, dubitatis quin ei vis esset adlata?* *Brut.* 35, 126: *quam ille facile tali ingenio, diutius si vixisset, vel paternam esset vel avitam gloriam consecutus! eloquentia quidem nescio an habuisset parem neminem*; *ibid.* 41, 151: *atque haud scio an par principibus esse potuisset*; after which examples

¹ Even where the tense demanded by the theory of the sequence is found, yet the preference is for the periphrastic form, as in *Liv.* 10, 45, 3: *Subibat cogitatio animum quonam modo tolerabilis futura Etruria fuisset, si quid in Samnio adversi evenisset*; 28, 24, 2: *apparuitque quantam excitatura molem vera fuisset clades*; and so frequently.

² To say that the imperfect has to be retained because the present would express something different, namely, a future conclusion, is to attribute to the tenses of the subjunctive that power of expressing temporal relations which it is the purpose of this paper to claim for them.

it needs no boldness whatever to say, as I now do without reserve, that *the tenses of the Latin subjunctive, alike in dependent and in independent sentences, tell their own temporal story*—that *no such thing as is meant by the doctrine of the Sequence of Tenses exists*.

But the conviction thus reached of the non-existence of an outside power controlling the tense of a subordinate verb is seen to be not merely true, but pleasingly true, the most natural and probable thing in the world, when we recall—what is now become a commonplace of the grammarians—that nearly all the dependent constructions were once simply independent constructions having neighbors related in the speaker's mind but not in formal expression; and that they then, as all agree, were able to tell their own temporal story. For example, the paratactical *Quid agerem? Nesciebam* (What *was* I to do? I *had* no idea) becomes *Quid agerem, nesciebam* (What I *was* to do, I *had* no idea). Can any one, then, seriously suppose that a Roman, using the imperfect in the side-by-side construction *Quid agerem? Nesciebam* because it expressed his meaning, would in the composite sentence use the imperfect *Quid agerem* because he used a secondary tense in the main clause? In the paratactical form *quid agerem* expressed that which he had to say, while *quid agam* would have expressed an entirely different thing, which he didn't at all want to say. Now, in the composite *Quid agerem, nesciebam*, is it not so obvious that it is hardly conceivable that there should ever have been any occasion for a paper on the subject, that *quid agerem* was said, and not *quid agam*, because *quid agerem* expressed what the speaker had to say, while *quid agam* would have expressed an entirely different thing? It is, in point of fact, not credible that a sweeping doctrine like that of the tenselessness of all dependent subjunctives could ever have come into general acceptance if it had been broached to a generation that had interested itself in the natural history of the subordinate constructions.

III.

The selection of examples given in the first paper showed that any combination of temporal ideas (main and subordinate) that may possibly enter into a healthy brain is capable of expression in Latin (as would be expected), and that, when the combination is an unusual one, the subordinate verb is, alone and by itself, expressive of temporal relations as fully as an independent verb would be. To this position no denial is possible.

The highly probable explanation of the whole field of phenomena, usual and unusual alike, was, as we saw, that the power indubitably found to be exercised by a given tense in a given construction in an unusual combination was inherent in the tense, in whatsoever combination, usual or unusual. Where, as in the present case, a cause the existence of which is absolutely proved will account for all the phenomena observed, it is bad science to assume the existence of a second and entirely different cause. Further than this, it was shown that an absurd conclusion would follow from the adoption of the theory of a second cause in these phenomena, viz. that the present subjunctive in the result-clause is incapable of expressing the present result of a past activity immediately upon the conclusion of that activity, but is capable of expressing the present result of the very same activity ten years later.

In the present paper it has also been shown that the objections which might be brought against the theory that the subjunctive has temporal expressiveness disappear under examination. The case would seem to me to be made out, if I were to stop here. Nevertheless, I can conceive that a doubt in regard to one point may remain in the minds of some of those who have held the doctrine of the Sequence of Tenses, and that a subtilized form of the doctrine may throw up an intrenchment in their minds upon this point; and I desire to show that no possible point of intrenchment exists.

We are obliged (they may say) to feel the living force of the tense in the unusual constructions, but we do not feel it in the usual constructions. The tense must clearly originally have had, in at least nearly every case, the power which we see it displaying in unusual combinations; but in the usual combinations it seems to us to have become a mere form—not a living tense, but a *speech-type*.

If the doctrine of the Sequence had not been in possession of the field for many years, the burden of proof would not fall upon an opponent of the doctrine, but upon its supporters. There are very strong antecedent objections against any form whatever in which it may be held. Let us consider what the effect of subordination is upon tense, starting from the Sprachgefühl of a modern language. No one has a right to object to such a method, for, even though the modern Sprachgefühl be a dangerous tool to handle, it is absolutely the only one that Heaven has vouchsafed us. Compare now the independent deliberatives in English and

Latin. *What am I to do* is *quid agam*, *what was I to do* is *quid agerem*. The sole difference between the first set and the second lies in the time at which the question is placed. *Quid agerem* and *quid agam* differ precisely as *am* and *was* differ, and in no other wise. Whatever be the history of the tenses of the Latin subjunctive in practical use, the idea of the present lies in *quid agam* as fully and strongly as in *what am I to do*, the idea of the past in *quid agerem* as fully and strongly as in *what was I to do*. Now let these sentences be attached to others, and we have, *e. g.*, *I don't know what I am to do*, *I didn't know what I was to do*,—*quid agam nescio*, *quid agerem nesciebam*. Has anything happened to destroy the activity of the tenses of *agam* and *agerem*? The absolutely identical English construction has kept its full temporal power; the *am*, the *was* have not lost their meaning. But the *am*, the *was* are a part of the very nature of *quid agam* and *quid agerem*. What ground is there for supposing that constructions absolutely identical in two languages, passing through absolutely the same experience, should suffer absolutely opposite fates? And how, there being no conceivable ground whatever for such a belief, can one nevertheless swear 'tis so, when he discovers and admits that this very same dependent *quid agerem* does retain its full force, precisely as does the English *what was I to do*, when found after a present:—*I ask you what I was to do*, *quaero a te quid agerem*? The last thing to be expected is that these fully expressive tenses will ever become, participial-like, half tenseless.¹ And the moment they are found with undeniably full temporal meaning in any construction of the same class, it is sound logic, and the only sound logic, to suppose that they have nowhere lost their temporal expressiveness.

This applies fully and without reservation to a construction that has remained unchanged in nature, like the deliberative. But it also applies with equal force to constructions that have suffered

¹ The fact is that the original force of the tenses in this and that construction must have been constantly preserved to the Roman mind, as it should be to that of the modern reader, by certain related constructions. *E. g.* the use of the jussive subjunctive without introductory particle in the *oratio obliqua* would keep fresh the temporal expressiveness of the verb in those subordinated jussive forms which we call final *qui*- and *ut*-clauses; the frequent collocation of the direct jussive and the corresponding dependent interrogative form (deliberative) would keep fresh the temporal expressiveness of the verb of the latter, as in Plaut. Merc. 624-5 (an "exception" to the Law of the Sequence, by the way): *Quid ego facerem*?—*Quid tu faceres, men rogas*? *Requirereres, rogitares* . . .; etc.

some change of nature, unless there is distinct proof that this change has taken place in the temporal power itself. The jussive, *e. g.*, has a *future* force, the present placing the commanding as thought at the present moment, the imperfect as thought at a past moment. The construction, once independent, in time becomes very closely subordinated, but the future force is precisely that part of the original jussive force which remains unimpaired. And so the argument might be carried on through all the constructions of subordination. It could be shown that the original temporal force remained unimpaired in every construction except that of a part of the consecutive clauses; and even here it would be found that, though the present had changed its force, and the imperfect had changed its force, yet they had held to their power of saying, the one *in connection with this present*, and the other *in connection with that past time*; and that each was ready to tell its individual story in any company of main verbs whatsoever.¹

But, happily, we are not dependent upon antecedent grounds, strong though they are. This subtile doctrine that the subordinate tense is at one moment living, at another lifeless, even if it had probabilities on its side, could be confronted with entirely sufficient indications of its unsoundness. Of these indications, some are themselves subtile, others very palpable.

1. The historical present puts a past, perhaps a very remote, act as if it were going on before the eyes of us, the readers. It is as

¹ There can be no doubt that the tenselessness of many of our modern idioms in subordinate clauses has done much to blunt our sensitiveness for the temporal expressiveness of the corresponding Latin idioms. For the relative final clause in Plaut. Trin. 740-41: *non temere dicant te benignum virgini: datam tibi dotem ei quam dares eius a patre*, our common phrase would be *to give (they'd say a dowry had been given to you, to give in turn to her, as from her father)*, a form which conveys no idea of the *place* of the plan in respect of the time of its formation. In the Latin, however, the form is precisely as in *daretis* and *quaereret* in Ter. Phorm. 296-7: *non fuit necesse habere: sed id quod lex iubet, dotem daretis; quaereret alium virum*. *It wasn't necessary to take her to wife: the thing for you to do, as the law enjoins, was to give her a dowry, and the thing for her to do was to hunt up somebody else for a husband (you were to give, she was to hunt up—ex post facto commands)*. If, now, we were to translate the subordinate jussive clause (so-called final) *quam dares* in the Trinummus by the same formula as in the independent jussive *daretis* in the Phormio (*they'd say a dowry had been given you, which you were to give to her*), and if we similarly everywhere used, in Roman fashion, precisely the same English form for a given dependent construction and its independent form, the idea would never have been tolerated that the dependent subjunctives in Latin are void of temporal meaning.

if we sat in the theatre and saw the things of long ago done upon the stage. In Livy's story of what followed the death of Lucretia, we first hear the solemn oath of Brutus, "By this once holy blood I swear to pursue the whole brood of the Tarquins." We see him hand the knife to Collatinus, to Lucretius, to Valerius. We see them repeat his oath. Before our eyes they carry the body to the forum. We see the gathering of men, their lamentations, and their growing fury. It is not history that is given us, it is the mimic stage. Now, these stage-presents are followed in a dependent clause (say a final clause) now by a primary tense, now by a secondary. What is it that tells us, as we read, whether we are to keep up the fiction of the theatre, and wait to see the act of the final clause, say the intended blow of a murderer, actually performed upon the stage, or are to drop the illusion, and return to the fact of sober narrative, namely, that this was once upon a time a purpose? It is nothing but the verb of the final clause itself. In that verb, and in no other, lie, or do not lie, the directions. The choice of the subordinate verb is itself just as perfect and complete a method of communication between writer and reader as is the choice, for the main verb, between the sober aorist and the stagy present.¹

2. The Roman has but one word for the aorist and the present perfect. As we read a complex sentence having for its main verb this defectively expressive form, what is it that tells us whether the writer thought aorist or thought present perfect? It is the tense of the dependent subjunctive. However it may have come to its meaning, it is gifted with power to tell us the very nature of the main verb. Here, then, the tense is clearly living.

3. The present perfect is capable, while remaining its true self, of being associated with either primary or, as in the final clauses given on pp. 463-4, with secondary tenses. What is it that tells us in such sentences whether the speaker puts his purpose as now entertained, or as entertained (say) at the beginning of the action? It is, not the inflexible main verb, but the flexible verb of the subordinate clause. Here, then, the tense is clearly living.

4. In impassioned language the present infinitive is often used in exclamations, even though the act or state thought of lies in the past, as in Ter. Hec. 532: *Adeone pervicaci esse animo, ut*

¹ To say, as Roby does (and others in differing phrases), that "the historical present is, in its effect on the verbs directly or indirectly dependent on it, sometimes regarded as a primary, sometimes as a secondary tense," is to content oneself with words.

puerum praeoptares perire. The idea of your being so obstinate that you preferred that the boy should die! (the tense of *praeoptares* as distinctly tells us that the act lies in the past, as does the tense of *preferred* in the translation); Cic. Sull. 20, 57: *iam vero illud quam incredibile, quam absurdum, qui Romae caedem facere, qui hanc urbem inflammare vellet, eum familiarissimum suum dimittere ab se et amandare in ultimas terras!* *Then too how incredible, how absurd, the idea of his being dismissed and packed off to the end of the world by the man who wanted to butcher people in Rome, who wanted to set this city on fire!*

Here, again, it is not the main verb, but the subordinate verb that tells the temporal story. The speaker relies wholly upon the subordinate verb for the conveying of the time of the whole sentence.

5. But the case is even stronger than this. For the number of sentences in Latin is very great in which there is no main verb whatever, and the entire burden of the expression of time falls upon the subordinate verb, as in Ter. Phorm. 364-7: *Sacpe interea mihi senex narrabat se hunc neclegere cognatum suum. At quem virum! quem ego viderim in vita optimum.* *The old man used now and then to tell me that this relative of his was treating him shabbily. But what a man! the best I have seen in all my life;* Juv. 157-8: *O qualis facies et quali digna tabella cum Gaetula ducem portaret belua luscum.* *What a sight, what a subject for a painting when the monster from Gaetulia was carrying on his back the great general—minus one eye;* Cic. Quinct. 26, 80: *O hominem fortunatum, qui* (see how we wait for the verb to give us our temporal conception) *eius modi nuntios seu potius Pegasos habeat!* *O happy man, that has such messengers or rather winged horses!* In Cic. pro Arch. 10, 24: *O fortunate, inquit, adulescens, qui tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris*, the subjunctive *inveneris* conveys the temporal idea for the whole sentence as perfectly as does the indicative *attulisti* in Cic. Flacc. 40, 102: *O nox illa, quae paene aeternas huic urbi tenebras attulisti*, and the indicative *ὑποκρίνεται* in Aristoph. Acharn. 400-1: *ὦ τρισμακάρι' Εὐριπίδη, ὅθ' ὁ δούλος οὕτωςι σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται.* So, then, it is not necessary, in order that the tense should carry to the mind a distinct temporal meaning, that it should follow a verb in whose company one is surprised to find it. The subordinate verb is capable, not only of piecing out the defective temporal expression of the main verb, as under 4 above, but even of getting along

entirely without it—of doing the entire work of temporal expression for the whole sentence.

6. A subordinate verb which, on the theory of the Sequence, accepts its tense from the main verb, nevertheless, upon that same theory, may, and mostly does, force its own dependent verb according to its will, and, breaking it off from all dependence upon the main verb, dictate to it what its tense shall be; in other words, to use a homely but scientifically exact phrase, it is only “playing dead,” as in Cic. Ros. Am. 14, 141: *Quaeramus quae tanta vitia fuerint in unico filio, quare is patri displiceret*. Let us inquire what great faults there were in this only son, that would make him obnoxious to his father.

To grant to the subordinate tense the power of expressing in usual combinations the same meaning that it expresses in unusual combinations is a much easier postulate than to refuse to it the power to express meaning in itself, while conceding to it the power to dictate to another subjunctive what its tense shall be.

7. If we can find some indicative construction which, in passing into the subjunctive in the indirect discourse, would need to change its tense if there is a Law of the Sequence, we can get an absolute settlement of the whole question by watching its behavior. Such a construction is to be found in the common use of the aorist in temporal clauses introduced by *ubi*, *ut*, *postquam* and *simul atque*, as in Cic. Fam. 5, 2, 4: *Postea vero quam profectus es, velim recordere, quae ego de te in senatu egerim, quae in contionibus dixerim, quas ad te litteras miserim*.

When such a clause is thrown into the indirect discourse and made dependent upon a past tense, then, if the theory is true that dependent verbs have no temporal expressiveness, the dependent verb which we are watching will go into the pluperfect subjunctive, losing its peculiar individuality of expression; whereas if the theory is true that the dependent verb has an unimpaired power of temporal expression in and of itself, our dependent verb will be found doing in the indirect discourse precisely what it did in the direct discourse, unchanged in tense, affected in no respect whatever except that of mood. But everybody knows that, while in perhaps one case in ten the pluperfect is found, just as it is in the independent construction (cf. Liv. 43, 6, 8: *hoc etiam Lampsaceni, octoginta pondo coronam adferentes* petebant, commemorantes discessisse se a Perseo, postquam Romanus exercitus in Macedoniam venisset, with Liv. 44, 25, 9: *ubi ad pecuniae*

mentionem ventum erat, *ibi* haesitabat), in the other nine cases it is the unchanged perfect that we find, as in Liv. 1, 1, 7: *alii proelio victum Latinum pacem cum Aenea, deinde adfinitatem iunxisse tradunt; alii, cum instructae acies constitissent, priusquam signa canerent, processisse Latinum inter primores ducemque advenarum evocasse ad conloquium; percunctatum deinde, qui mortetes essent, unde aut quo casu profecti domo quidve quaerentes in agrum Laurentinum exissent, postquam audierit multitudinem Troianos esse, ducem Aeneam . . . fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse. . . . others have the version that Latinus inquired who they were, etc., and, when he heard (not had heard) that they were Trojans . . . gave by the offer of his hand a solemn bond of peace for the future; Cic. Rep. 2, 2, 4: *is igitur, ut natus sit, cum Remo fratre dicitur ab Amulio rege Albano ob labefactandi regni timorem ad Tiberim exponi iussus esse; Fam. 4, 3, 4: tantum dicam, quod te spero adprobaturum, me postea quam illi arti, cui studueram, nihil esse loci neque in curia neque in foro viderim, omnem meam curam atque operam ad philosophiam contulisse. Fam. 5, 8, 3: de me sic existimes ac tibi persuadeas vehementer velim, non me repentina aliqua voluntate aut fortuito ad tuam amplitudinem meis officiis amplectendam incidisse, sed, ut primum forum attigerim, spectasse semper, ut tibi possem quam maxime esse coniunctus.**

In the same way, when the common phrase *non putaram* goes into the subjunctive in the *oratio obliqua*, it preserves its individuality of tense, as in Cic. Sen. 2, 4: *obrepere aiunt eam citius quam putassent; Att. 6, 1, 6; and frequently.* No more absolute proof of the temporal expressiveness of the attached subjunctive verb could be desired than is given by these usages.¹

IV.

The destructive part of my task has taken so much space that

¹A complete survey of existing views would include a discussion of the application of the doctrine of Absolute and Relative Time to the field of the supposed sequence. The limits of the present paper exclude such discussion. What has been said above, however, in regard to a possible subtilized theory applies *a fortiori* to the coarser theory of Absolute and Relative Time; nor have I any fear that a reader who has agreed with me thus far will find a resting-place in that doctrine.

At a future day I hope to show that the doctrine is untenable. Nevertheless it has performed, especially in Germany, the good service of weakening popular faith in the universal truth of the old doctrine.

I am obliged to state the constructive part in very summary fashion.

With certain exceptions, each tense of the indicative indicates to the hearer two things, the stage of advancement of the action (whether it be complete, in process, or yet to be), and the position in time of the point of view from which the act is regarded (whether it be somewhere in the past, at the moment of speaking, or somewhere in the future). In each of the three verbs (*domus*) *aedificata erat*, *aedificata est*, *aedificata erit*, the house is presented in a completed state, the point of view alone changing. These verbs are, to use a more exact nomenclature than the one in vogue, respectively *past* perfect, *present* perfect, *future* perfect. In the same way *aedificabatur*, *aedificatur*, *aedificabitur* represent an action in process in the past, at the present, in the future; or, more exactly, these verbs are respectively *past* imperfect, *present* imperfect, *future* imperfect. In the three verbs *aedificaturus erat*, *aedificaturus est*, *aedificaturus erit* we have, similarly, a *past* future, a *present* future, and a *future* future.

Now, these indications in themselves convey each two things only: 1. The point of view of the mind asserting; 2. The stage of the action at that point of view. But a third conception necessarily enters in. If an act can be asserted to be in a complete state at a certain time in the past, it is a certainty that the activity had been prior to the time thought of as the standpoint. The idea of the priority of the act to the standpoint is, then, practically conveyed by the three perfect tenses. In the same way, if an act is asserted as in process at a certain time in the past, it is inevitable that the activity was contemporaneous with the time thought of as the standpoint. The three imperfect tenses, then, convey, in addition to standpoint and stage of action, a third idea, that of contemporaneousness. Each of these six tenses thus practically carries three distinct ideas to the hearer's mind: 1. The point of view from which the speaker puts the act; 2. The stage of advancement of the act at that point of view; and 3. The temporal relation of the activity itself to that point of view.

The subjunctive likewise is furnished with tenses which indicate that the point of view from which the act is seen in imagination is in the past or at the present, and that the act is seen as complete, or is seen without reference to completion (the *past* complete and *present* complete, the *past* non-complete and *present* non-complete). In other words, the subjunctive tenses indicate standpoint

and stage. So far they are like the indicative tenses. But they go no farther. The idea of the temporal relation of the activity to the standpoint, of its being before, or being at, or being after the standpoint, cannot, in the very nature of the mood, be involved. If, at the present moment, I form a picture in my brain of (say) a book completed, there is absolutely nothing in the tense that can fix the act at any point between the beginning of time and the end of time. The vision of the completed book may be of a book said to have been made long ago, or it may be of a book which I hope to have in completed shape ten years hence. The point of view is definite and exact; but from the very fact that there is no assertion of outward reality in the subjunctive mood, but merely an imagining of an act, no exact placing of the act here or there in time is possible. It follows that a form like *scriptus sit*, e. g., which is in its earliest history a parallel of neither the perfect indicative nor of the future perfect indicative, but merely a vision of a finished act, is used to represent what corresponds in the subjunctive to both these very different forms. I may say, for example, *ab Homero scripta sit* (*suppose that Homer did write the Iliad*), and, by the same tense, *sit denique inscriptum in fronte unius cuiusque quid de re publica sentiat*. Cic. Cat. 1, 13, 32 (*be it written on every man's forehead whether he is loyal or disloyal*). In the same way the past non-complete subjunctive *facere*m and the present non-complete subjunctive *facia*m strictly present to the mind only a vision of an act without reference to completion, seen from a past and a present standpoint respectively. In these tenses, however, we find a certain necessary limitation. The activity is not thought as lying back of the standpoint, for then the tense used would be one of the perfects. But further than this there is no limit. The non-complete act seen in imagination as from the present moment may belong anywhere in the stretch from the present moment inclusive to the end of time, and the act similarly seen as non-complete from a past standpoint may belong anywhere in the stretch from that time on to the end of time. In other words, the subjunctive tenses of non-complete action can apply to any act present to or future to the standpoint.¹

¹ In this immediate power of application to the speaker's future lies the explanation of the fact that no new and specialized subjunctives from a future standpoint have arisen; and herein also is the origin of the temporal power of the so-called indicatives of the future, themselves no indicatives originally, but (to speak as a Latinist) subjunctives.

The subjunctive tenses, then, indicate, like the indicative tenses, the point of view from which the act is put as pictured in the brain, and the stage of advancement in which the act is represented to be; but they here part company with the indicative, and are incapable of expressing the temporal relation of priority, contemporaneousness, or futurity to the standpoint. The complete tenses can apply to any act seen as complete anywhere in the whole range of time; while the non-complete tenses can apply to any act seen as non-complete at or after the standpoint.

So much, and only so much, is inherent in the nature of the subjunctive tenses. But in their actual use in conveying this or that idea, a temporal feeling inevitably grows up with regard to each use of each of them. In thinking a realizable wish or a command (the point of view being of course the speaker's present) we have a mental vision of the act as lying in the future (whether immediate or remote); and the hearer, getting our idea, naturally associates futurity with the *tense* of the verb. In making a concession from the present point of view, on the other hand, we mostly have in mind a present act or state, or an act or state completed by or before the present; and the hearer, getting our idea, naturally associates contemporaneousness or priority, as the case may be, with the *tense* of the verb. In this way there arise two distinct accretions of meaning for each subjunctive tense—significations not inherent in the nature of the tense, but naturally involved in the special kind of idea which the tense is used to convey. The so-called perfect subjunctive serves as an aorist or present perfect, and also as a future perfect; the so-called present serves both as a present and as a future; and, in the same way, the so-called pluperfect serves as a past perfect and as a past future perfect, the so-called imperfect as a past present and a past future. In other words, in practical use each tense of the subjunctive is found to be employed with two distinct ideas, one that which is indicated by the tense of the indicative bearing the same name (as in indirect questions), the other a future idea (as in the final clause, commands in indirect discourse, etc.); so that the so-called pluperfect and the so-called perfect serve, from their respective standpoints, as either perfect or future perfect, and the so-called imperfect and present serve from their respective standpoints as either present or future.

With each subjunctive construction, then, there is in time associated a definite temporal meaning, seen clearly in the independent

construction, and abiding in the dependent use of it. The jussive, *e. g.*, refers to a time future to the standpoint, and its dependent application (the final clause) expresses a present purpose (present subjunctive), or a past purpose (imperfect subjunctive). And in the same way a definite temporal meaning is found to be attached to each subjunctive dependent construction that has grown out of an independent subjunctive construction, while in each dependent subjunctive construction that is a conversion (the indirect discourse) of the indicative construction, the meaning is precisely the same as in the indicative; the clause *quid scripsisset*, *e. g.*, meaning precisely the same thing, so far as anything but mood goes, as *quid scripserat*.

Now, how to bring this to bear for a beginner? First make him understand precisely what the indicatives convey to the mind. Then show him, by giving him parallel examples in the direct question and the indirect question, that the tenses of the subjunctive convey precisely the same mental standpoint, or point of view, as the tenses of the indicative bearing the same name. Have this idea of the standpoint very clearly felt by the pupil. Then, in no haste, show him by examples that each tense of the subjunctive, beside the force corresponding to that of the indicative bearing the same name, has a future force, as in the purpose clause, the standpoint always remaining unchanged. Add to that the statement that, by a peculiar development, the tenses for conditions, conclusions, and wishes put as from a past standpoint came to convey the idea of conditions, conclusions, and wishes contrary to fact, in Latin as in English, and that by another peculiar development the imperfect came to express past results in their temporal relation with their causes, and you have a practical treatment covering the entire ground. For the converse work of writing Latin, tell the student to use a pluperfect or imperfect to indicate that the point of view is past, *i. e.*, if it is a past purpose, a past question, a past ground of action, and so on; and a perfect or present to indicate that the point of view is present or future, *i. e.*, if it is a present purpose, a present question, a present ground of action, etc. Make him see that our use of tenses in English is mostly the same, alike in independent and in dependent sentences, as, *e. g.*, in the coördinated *What was she trying to tell me? I had no idea*, and the subordinating *I had no idea what she was trying to tell me*.

This is all simple enough, and young children, provided they have not been taught a rule that "primary tenses are followed by

primary," etc., have, as has been proved by actual experiment performed by other teachers under my own eyes and at a distance, no difficulty in understanding it in an entirely real and unmechanical way. But no one can venture to make such a statement as regards the practical working of the rule about primary tenses being followed by secondary, and the rest. *Understanding* is precisely the thing that cannot be claimed for those mental processes in interpreting and writing Latin tenses which the grammars aim to set up in the learner's mind. The directions which I have given above, though they take the student only part way on the road toward a complete theoretical understanding of the whole matter, are sound as far as they go, and calculated to develop understanding, needing only to be filled out at a later day; while the ordinary rules, which are founded on nothing but a count of examples, are calculated to beget a self-contented mental vacuity, and must be wholly swept away before any true comprehension can be brought about.

If, in opposition, it is urged that students must have the rule of the Sequence in order to write Latin, I should answer, first, that they do not handle their tenses so successfully at present, even under the help of the Law, as to justify any white lies; secondly, that a man who hits the right tense by a rule of thumb without understanding or feeling, writes better Latin but is not a better man; thirdly, that, though the uses are essentially the same in German and French, one who should attempt to introduce a doctrine of a Sequence as indispensable in learning to write those languages would be derided; and, lastly, I should call attention to the fact that the rule of the Sequence very frequently betrays the student. Every teacher must have had the experience of correcting, under a hidden linguistic impulse, such as will sometimes rise above the grammars, a Latin tense written by a student in entire conformity to the rule, but conveying a wholly different idea from the English which it is meant to represent. Suppose, for example, I ask a student to express in Latin, under the "Law," *what was the character of the state at that time, and what had it been up to that time?* He will write, with perfect feeling for the tenses, *qualis erat illo tempore civitas, et qualis antea fuerat*. Suppose, now, I ask him to write in Latin *let us see, in Cato's own words, what was the character of the state at that time, and what it had been before that time*. He will not dare to write *qualis esset illo tempore civitas, et antea qualis fuisset, videamus in ipsa sententia Catonis*, as a student

who knew nothing about a Sequence of Tenses would, and as St. Augustine, who also had the advantage of being in ignorance of the rule, did, in *De Civ. Dei*, 5, 12; neither would he dare to write *though the battle lasted till evening, nobody could catch sight of an enemy's back*, as Caesar did in *B. G.* I, 26.

V.

And now a brief last word about the history and the hopes of the doctrine here professed, that the tenses of the subordinated subjunctives are expressive, not mechanically dictated by a preceding verb; that they mean the same thing, tell the same story, as the tenses of the corresponding independent indicatives or independent subjunctives.

In 1872 Lieven (*Die Consecutio Temporum bei Cicero*), laying down the traditional rules for the Sequence, proved by examples that consecutive, causal, concessive and relative sentences (not final) are exempt from the law when following secondary tenses, and that unreal conditional sentences are exempt from the law when following primary tenses. Other apparent exceptions he accounted for on the theory of "pregnant" uses of the main tense. His dictum ("The tense chosen in the subordinate sentence is that which would have to be chosen if the sentence were independent") would have been a complete statement of the matter, if it had been intended to be thoroughgoing. In point of fact, however, he limits it to the cases above mentioned. The way in which he went astray is clear: he treats the subjunctive in the main as a mere mood of subordination. As he glances back over the growth of the language from the paratactic to the hypotactic stage, he sees independent indicatives becoming subjunctives, and retaining their tense; and so far he sees quite rightly. But he fails to see the great part which is played by the passing over of independent *subjunctive* constructions into the dependent form. And, in so doing, he not only misleads himself in regard to the history of the subjunctive causal, concessive, and consecutive sentences (all of which, as I hope to show in a later paper, go back to independent *subjunctives*), assuming them to be substantially merely subordinated indicatives, but also draws his line of limitation for the exceptions very far short of the true point, and leaves the old rules in the main standing. In spite of this, however, the method he applied ends logically in the destruction of the traditional doctrine, though he himself failed to see its full sweep.

Five years later, Martin Wetzel, in his doctorate-dissertation (Goettingen), said in his preface that the force and meaning of each tense was the same in the subjunctive as in the indicative, so that the question why this and that tense was found to have been employed did not turn upon a Law of Sequence, but upon the force inherent in each; and that, consequently, to speak accurately, there was no such thing as a Sequence of Tenses. The statement is in reality nothing more than Lieven's statement more effectively put, but subject to the same errors and limitations.¹ The examination is confined to an analysis of the uses of the tenses in subjunctives which are such by reason of being in the indirect discourse, and to certain *changes* of tenses of other subjunctives in the indirect discourse after a main verb of one and another tense; and does not take up the question of the force of the tenses in dependent subjunctives corresponding to independent subjunctives.² And Wetzel's subsequent work should have carried him on, through a wider survey of the field, to the doctrine that the tenses of the subjunctives in dependent constructions convey the same meaning as the tenses of the subjunctives or indicatives, whichever it may be, in the corresponding independent constructions. But, as we shall shortly see, he did not attain to this doctrine.

In 1882 Ihm, in his *Quaestiones Syntacticae de Elocutione Tacitea comparato Caesaris Sallusti Vellei Usu Loquendi* (Giessen), finds the solution of the whole problem in the application of the doctrine of Absolute and Relative Time—that doctrine, taught by Hoffmann and supported by Lübbert, which has been so potent in Germany and America, for good or for evil, since the appearance in 1870 of the latter's *Die Syntax von Quom.* Ihm was followed in 1884 by Lattmann and Müller in their *Kurzgefasste Lateinische Grammatik*, and in 1885 Wetzel, in his *Beiträge zur Lehre von der Consecutio Temporum*, amends, and, as amended, accepts the doctrine of Lattmann and Müller. The same man, then, who in 1877 said, at the end of his university career, the best thing that had then been said on the subject, and was distinctly

¹ Cf. also, from the preface, p. 6, the following: *Ac deliberanti mihi saepenumero in eo potissimum omnium errorum fons et causa posita esse visa est, quod temporum consecutionem illud efficere, ut tempora in coniunctivo enuntiatorum secundariorum non omni ex parte eandem vim retineant quam in indicativo habent, sed sola verbi regentis forma definiantur, plerique opinantur.*

² The force of the tense of the subjunctive in the dependent deliberative question, the original consecutive clause, the final clause, is not the same as the force of any existing indicative construction.

on the right road, has led himself into the cloudland of Absolute and Relative Time. Meanwhile, however, Hermann Kluge, of the Gymnasium at Cöthen, published in 1883 a treatise of great importance, *Die Consecutio Temporum, deren Grundgesetz und Erscheinungen im Lateinischen*.¹

In this treatise Kluge, *omnia ad se trahens*, ignores the great suggestiveness of Lieven's and Wetzel's partial proposition of the years 1872 and 1877; ignores the very great contribution to a proper psychological treatment of the general question and the explanation of important details given by Otto Behaghel in 1878 in the treatise already cited; and ignores the very helpful statement of the general nature of the indicative and subjunctive tenses given by Haase in the second volume of the *Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft* (edited by Hermann Peter, 1880). Further, he is astray, *me iudice*, in very many important details, which I have space barely to enumerate in part, without discussion: The theory that the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive are originally tenseless, differing from the present and perfect only in presenting a more remotely conceived idea; the theory, naturally connected with this, that the use of the imperfect and pluperfect in wishes, conclusions, and conditions referring to the speaker's present is not derived, but original—a view which would find it hard to reckon with the indisputable origin of the imperfect and pluperfect indicative referring to the same time in cases like *oportuerat*, *oportebat*, and the analogy of the history of, *e. g.* auxiliaries like the English would, should, might (preterites), and

¹A word of personal explanation must at this point be granted me. The doctrine of this paper I taught, somewhat timorously, as became a young instructor, as early as the years 1877, 1878, and 1879, but with emphasis since the year 1880, when I was called to another university and to a position of responsibility. It was my purpose to publish and advocate my doctrine at the earliest possible moment, but in the press of duties I allowed the years to slip by, and was obliged to see the main tenet of my belief first printed in Kluge's book. As will appear below, I regard Kluge's treatment to be in many respects unsound; but the essential doctrine is true, that the tense of the subordinate verb is the direct expression of the speaker's meaning. Anticipated, then, in date of promulgation, and quite possibly even in actual length of years of possession of these views, I avow myself a supporter of Kluge, and a preacher of his faith. The question of priority of publication is, at the present point in the development of human nature, of much interest to the individual, but it is of little consequence to the world. What is of consequence is that sound doctrine should be reached as early as possible, and taught by as many men as possible.

the German würde, sollte, möchte, etc.; the theory that the imperfect indicative indicates duration of action ("Dauer"); the astounding theory that in a sentence like Livy's in I, 3: *tantum opes creverant . . . ut ne morte quidem Aeneae nec deinde inter muliebrem tutelam . . . movere arma . . . ulli alii accolae ausi sint*, the perfect is used because the statement fills Livy, as he tells the story, with such interest that the incident appears to him not to be on the same plane with the other points of the narrative, but to be, in a word, remarkable enough to be brought into connection with the actual present of the writer; by which Kluge means, as clearly appears elsewhere, that such perfects as *ausi sint* are *logical perfects*, *perfects definite*, utterly failing to recognize, as many had done, years ago, that these perfects are simply subjunctive aorists corresponding precisely to independent indicative aorists;¹ the theory that the final clause is developed out of the consecutive clause. He errs, moreover, in attributing metaphysical rather than concrete origins to the various dependent subjunctive constructions. He gives no proof, such as has been attempted in this paper, of the unsoundness of the prevailing doctrine, nor does he protect his theory from attack by raising and meeting the apparent objections founded on the common use of the imperfect subjunctive in result-clauses (he is quite wrong in the matter, regarding the tense as always indicating the action as "laufend"), and the use of the form *-urus fuerit* in subordinated conclusions contrary to fact, etc., etc. Nevertheless, the doctrine that in the subordinate sentence the speaker's meaning alone determines the tense is here for the first time stated sharply and as covering the whole ground; and to have done this is a very great service.

In no school grammar or manual published in Germany since then, however, has this doctrine been taught, so far as my knowledge goes—not, at any rate, in the grammars of Schottmüller-Putsche (1884), Ellendt-Seyffert (edition of 1886), Kühner's Elementargrammatik (1884). Of the still recent grammars, etc., published a little earlier, Josuweit's (1882) states to the full the old doctrine in these words: "In the dependent subjunctive the con-

¹ This forcing of the meaning of the perfects in question is as shortsighted as it is extraordinary; for Kluge fails to see that, when he has tortured these perfects into perfects definite, he still has to confront and account for the fact that, as noticed on page 65 of this paper, they themselves are followed in most cases by the imperfect and pluperfect.

ception of time utterly vanishes; that conception is given by the governing verb; nothing remains to the subjunctive except the conception of the act as complete or still lasting with reference to the governing verb" (§83). Feldmann (1882) says (§69, 3) that "result-clauses are not subjected to the Sequence of Tenses." Goldbacher (1883) says that in all "innerlich" dependent subjunctives the tense is under the influence of the tense in the governing sentence; these "innerlich" dependent subjunctives being those that are expressed as in the mind of the subject of the governing sentence, namely, final sentences, sentences after *antequam*, *priusquam*, *dum*, *donec*, *quoad*, many relative sentences, questions and subordinate verbs in the indirect discourse; in result-clauses, however, that tense is used which would have been used in an independent construction, excepting that in pure result-clauses with *ut* the imperfect usually stands after the perfect. Here is to be seen a single plant sprung from the seed planted by Lieven in 1872. In the grammars of Holzweissig (I have before me the edition of 1885) and Ellendt-Seyffert (1885 and 1886) a richer growth appears, but nothing more than in Lieven's treatise; for these grammars teach that the rules of the Sequence of Tenses hold, but only for "innerlich" dependent sentences, while consecutive, causal, concessive, and non-final relative sentences are not subject to the rule. In no school grammar in Germany, then, has the true doctrine found a lodgment. Still there is great significance in this distinct narrowing of the field of the operation of the Law. Such things show a drift of opinion; and that drift is clearly away from, not in the direction of, faith in the Law of the Sequence.

Antoine, in his *Syntaxe de la Langue Latine*, 1886, has got no farther on than Lieven. In the latest French grammar, Reinach's *Grammaire Latine*, a dissatisfaction with the old way and an unreadiness to break with it are shown at the same moment in the statement that "the concord of tenses in Latin is subject to two general rules, which are rather logical tendencies than laws of the language: 1. If the main verb refers to the present or the future, and the dependent to the present or the past, the present or perfect of the subjunctive is used in the dependent verb; 2. If the main verb refers to the past, the imperfect or pluperfect is used in the dependent verb"; and the same jarring of views is seen in the quoting of a sentence from Kluge and another from Ihm in the immediate neighborhood of the statement that "the other irregularities in the *consecutio temporum* are to be referred to the struggle

of logic with grammar," a sentence not to be reconciled with the true doctrine that the Latin tenses successfully tell their own story.

So, then, it appears that no school grammar has yet taught this simple doctrine. In one notable case, however, has a refreshing, even if too brief, treatment appeared, in what may be called a grammar for specialists. In the grammar of Stolz and Schmalz, published in 1885, before that of Reinach, the entire treatment of the "sogenannte consecutio temporum" is confined, with a noble disdain, to fifteen lines and two-thirds; and although no proof is given, and no light thrown upon the apparent difficulties, as, *e. g.*, the use of the imperfect in result-clauses (a matter especially suitable for explanation in a grammar of such aims), yet it is expressly laid down, in the exact words of Kluge's treatise, that "a mechanical dependence of the tenses of the subordinate sentence upon those of the main sentence does not exist, and that the choice of the tense in each sentence depends upon the conception lying at the bottom of it." After such a note as this, struck by what may be expected to prove an influential grammar, I have entire faith in the success, at no remote time, of the true doctrine, to the immense relief and profit of the Latin-studying mind. This true doctrine cannot, however, be preached to the people in the highways. It can reach them with ease and conviction only through their sacred books, the school grammars. And I therefore address my protest to that body of actual or potential makers of those sacred books, the constituency of the Journal of Philology.

WILLIAM GARDNER HALE.